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FIRST DAY

SECTION ONE
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
Richmond, Virginia - February 26, 1980

1. On June 5, 1978 Harry Hurt was severely injured when
he was struck by an automobile operated by Larry Lush as Hurt was
walking across Main Street in Staunton, Virginia. Hurt instituted
an action against Lush on November 15, 1978 in the Circuit Court
of the Citf of Staunton in which he alleged that Lush, while intoxicated, wantonly, maliciously and negligently caused injury
to Hurt and in which Hurt sought judgment against Lush for both
compensatory and punitive damages. After the parties were at issue,
Hurt and Lush sought the following information by pre-trial discovery:
(a)
By written interrogatory to Lush, Hurt asked Lush to
state whether Lush had liability insurance covering the injuries
allegedly sustained by Hurt and, if so, to state the name of the
insurance company and the limits of the policy.
(b)
By written interrogatory to Lush, Hurt asked Lush to
state his net worth and his gross earnings for each of the past
five years.
(c)
By a request for production of documents, Hurt requested
Lush to produce for inspection all diagrams and drawings of the
scene of the accident prepared by Lush's attorney.
(d)
By written interrogatory to Hurt, Lush asked Hurt to
state whether he had received any payments for the injuries he
sustained in the accident under any health, accident, hospital,
medical pay or other insurance and, if so, the name of the insurance
company or companies making such payments.
(e)
By a request for admission addressed by Lush to Dr.
Sawbones, who was Hurt's personal physician, Lush asked Dr. Sawbones
to admit that Hurt was 90% deaf at the time of the accident.
Each party filed timely objections to the discovery sought
by the other. How should the Court rule with respect to each of
those objections?
(The answer should be given with respect to
each lettered paragraph).
2.
On March 2, 1977, the Circuit Court of the City of Roanoke
("trial court"), sitting without a jury, entered judgment for the
plaintiff, Paul Perry, against the defendant, Dan Deadbeat, in
the amount of $8,700.00. On March 16, 1977, the Supreme Court
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of Virginia handed down an opinion which cast substantial doubt
upon the correctness of a ruling by the trial court to admit certain
evidence offered by the plaintiff, which evidence was essential
to support the judgment of March 2, 1977 for the plaintiff. The
opinion came to th~ attention of Deadbeat's attorney, Ursula Update,
in the late afternoon of March 23, 1977. Ms. Update, after unsuccessfully attempting to contact the plaintiff's attorney, met with
the trial court, explained her problem and asked leave to file
a motion for a new trial. The trial court entered the following
order on March 23, 1977:
For good cause shown, it is hereby ORDERED
that the time by which defendant, Dan Deadbeat, may file a motion for a new trial is
hereby extended to and including April 1, 1977.
Deadbeat, by his attorney, Ms. Update, filed such a motion,
giving proper notice to the attorney for the plaintiff Perry and,
after a hearing thereon, the trial court entered an order on April
15 vacating the judgment of March 2, 1977 and granting the defendant
a new trial. After a new trial on the merits on May 1, 1977, the
trial court, again sitting without a jury, entered judgment for
the defendant Deadbeat.
Plaintiff Perry was granted an appeal to the Supreme Court
of Virginia. His sole assignment of error was that the trial court
was without jurisdiction to enter the orders of April 15, 1977 and
May 1, 1977. He asked the. Supreme Court of Virginia to reinstate the
order of March 2, 1977 which had granted judgment to him.
How should the Court rule?
3. Paula Penn, a citizen of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
was injured in an accident on Route 95 just north of Richmond on
October 3, 1977 when an automobile which she was driving was struck
from behind by a truck driven by Darrell Driver, a citizen of Ashland, Virginia.
On January 3, 1978, Paula Penn institued an action
in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia,
Richmond Division, against Driver and Orville Owner, who was also
a citizen of Ashland, Virginia, in which she sought damages against
both defendants in the amount of $75,000.00 for her injuries.
Ms. Penn alleged that Driver was guilty of negligence which was
a proximate cause of her injuries, that the truck being operated
by Driver was owned by Owner, that Driver was an employee of Owner,
and that Driver was acting within the scope of his employment by
Owner at the time of the accident.
In their answers, the defendants
denied all allegations other than that alleging that Driver was
operating the truck at the time of the accident. By an affirmative
defense, both defendants alleged that Driver was confronted by
a sudden emergency at the time of the collision and therefore was
not responsible for the accident.
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A jury trial was held on May 5, 1978 during which Paula Penn,
who was represented by Eagle Beagle, introduced evidence sufficient
to establish that Driver was operating the truck and that the truck
was owned by Owner.
She also introduced sufficient evidence to
create a jury ques~ion with respect to her allegation that Driver
was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of her injuries.
She introduced no evidence to establish that Driver was an employee
of Owner at the time of the accident.
The only evidence introduced by the defendants at the trial
related to the issue of Driver's negligence and to the affirmative
defense of-~udden emergency.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, Dick Derry, who was
the attorney for the defendant Driver, made a motion for a directed
verdict on the ground that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff had
failed to prove that Driver was guilty of any negligence which
caused or contributed to cause the accident.
No other motions
were made by any of the parties.
After hearing argument thereon, Driver's motion was denied
by the trial judge and the case was submitted to the jury. The
jury returned the verdict on May 6, 1978 in favor of the plaintiff
Paula Penn in the amount of $55,000.00 against both defendants. ·
Sam Sleeper, attorney for the defendant Orville Owner, immediately moved the trial court to set aside the verdict against
Owner and to enter judgment for Owner notwithstanding the verdict
on the ground that plaintiff had failed to prove that Driver was
an agent or employee of Owner at the time of the accident and that
Owner was therefore entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter
of law.
How should the trial court rule on Owner's motion?
4. Terry Thug was tried and convicted by a jury in the Circuit
Court of the City of Lynchburg on March 3, 1978 for the crime of
armed robbery of Robert Smith while Smith and his wife were walking
along a Lynchburg street on the night of January 5, 1978. Thug's
punishment was fixed at 10 years in the penitentiary. The trial
court entered a final order sentencing Thug on this verdict.
At the trial, Thug was identified as one of the robbers by
Sam Squealer who had previously been convicted, but not yet sentenced, upon a guilty plea for participating in the robbery.
Neither
Mr. Smith nor Mrs. Smith could identify Thug since the persons who
robbed Mr. Smith had stocking masks over their faces.
However
both Mr. and Mrs. Smith testified in detail concerning the circumstances of the robbery. They both testified that one of the robbers
was about 6 feet 5 inches tall and the other was about 5 feet 5
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inches tall, that the robbery occurred about 11:50 p.m., that the
two men jumped out from behind a wall and grabbed them, that both
men wore stocking masks, that the larger of the two men had a bag
in his hand in which he placed the loot and that after the robbery
the two robbers split up and ran in different directions. All
of the above recited details were corroborated by the testimony
of Squealer.
Thug did not testify on his own behalf and at the request
of his attorney, L. Fee Hailey, the Court instructed the jury that
it was

* * *

~·-·

-

the right and privilege of the
defendant to testify or not to testify
and his failure to testify creates no
presumption against him and his failure to
testify is not a circumstance which the jury
should consider when arriving at its verdict.
During Hailey's closing argument to the jury, he made the
following statement, among others:
Ladies and Gentlemen, the defendant did
not take the stand and testify on his own
behalf.
Of course the court has told· you
that he had the right and privilege to
testify or not to testify.
Ladies and
Gentlemen, the defendant, Terry Thug, was not
afraid to testify.
He did not testify because
the Commonwealth has totally failed to prove
that Mr. Thug was in any way involved. We
know you are not going to convict this man
on the testimony of Squealer, a convicted
felon who is obviously trying to save his own
skin. The Commonwealth's case is so weak
that we did not want to dignify it by calling
Mr. Thug to the stand. We just didn't think
it was necessary in this case.
The Commonwealth's attorney in his argument to the jury discussed
Mr. Hailey's argument by saying:
Remember, Ladies and Gentlemen, each and every
detail of Squealer's testimony concerning the
circumstances of the robbery is exactly the
same as the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Smith.
Mr. Hailey did not bring before you a single
witness to dispute a single thing that Squealer
said or a single thing that Mr. and Mrs. Smith
said. Look at Thug - he is about 6 feet 5
~nches tall.
And remember Squealer - you saw
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him - he testified that he was 5 feet 7 inches
tall. And in spite of all that testimony Mr.
Hailey says the Commonwealth had such a weak
case that he didn't think it was necessary for
Mr. Thug to take the stand.
The defendant objected to this portion of the argument of
the Commonwealth's attorney and the trial court overruled that
objection.
The Supreme Court of Virginia granted Thug a writ of error
limited to~the claim that the trial court erred in permitting the
Commonwealth's attorney to comment on Thug's failure to testify.
He argued that such comment by the Commonwealth's attorney was
in violation of the defendant's right against self-incrimination
under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution
of Virginia and was in violation of the statute of Virginia which
provides that the failure of a defendant to testify shal+. not "be
the subject of any comment before the Court or the jury.. bY the
prosecuting attorney".
;E~
,
Did the trial court err by permitting the Common ·ealffiVs
attorney to make the argument quoted above over the'?"t)bjection of
the d~ef end ant?
·.~'~',, ~
5.
In April 1979 ABC Corporation (Complainant) filed a bill
of complaint in the Circuit Court of Albemarle County against Robert
Jones (Defendant). The bill alleged that the Defendant, its former
employee, had embezzled at least $16,000 of funds belonging to
.the Complainant and used the money to purchase two horses and an
automobile. The complaint prayed that the two horses and automobile
purchased by Defendant be held in trust for Complainant, that the
Defendant be required to deliver them to Complainant, that Defendant
be required to make an accounting of the money embezzled, and that he
be restrained from disposing of the horses and automobile during the
litigation.
On October 19, 1979, after an accounting, the Chancellor
found that Defendant had embezzled $16,000 belonging to the Complainant and by his final decree granted appropriate relief.
On February 21, 1980, Defendant Jones comes to you for the
first time for legal advice.
He asks whether there is any procedure
by which he might obtain relief from the decree.
Your examination
of the record in the chancery proceeding revealfa that, in response
to the bill of complaint, the Defendant had filed a plea denying
that he had unlawfully taken any money belonging to the Complainant.
To this plea the Complainant had filed a general replication. The
Defendant had then filed a motion demanding a jury trial on the issue
raised by the plea. The Chancellor, over Defendant's objection, by
his order, had denied him a trial by jury. After tbe Chancellor
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had proceeded to hear the evidence ore tenus, he entered his final
decree in favor of the Complainant.~(a)
decree?

By what means, if any, may Jones

se~k

relief from the

(b)

Within what period of time must he do this?

(c)

Is leave of court necessary?

How ought you to answer each of these questions?
6.
Sunny Supermarket contracted with Ajax Detective Service
("Ajax"), a reputable agency, to provide security guards to control
traffic in the grocery store's parking lot and to accompany Supermarket personnel to the bank to make deposits. Ajax assigned Kilgore
Bass, one of its armed security guards, to the job. On September
1, 1979, Bass was patrolling the parking lot when Rupert Smith
emerged from the store accompanied by a local policeman who appeared
to Bass to be arresting Smith.
Smith suddenly ran from the scene
and, when the police officer stumbled and fell, Bass took up the
pursuit.
Frustrated when Smith pulled away from him, Bass shot
Smith twice in the leg, seriously injuring him.
Smith brought an action at law against Bass, Ajax, and Supermarket in the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County, Virginia, for
damages for personal injuries proximately caused by Bass. At the
trial of the case the evidence introduced showed that:
the security
guards, including Bass, were employed, instructed, supervised,
paid and discharged by Ajax; Supermarket had no voice in the selection of those who were hired by Ajax; if, however, Supermarket
found a guard to be unsatisfactory, it would notify Ajax who would
then assign a different guard to the job; Supermarket had little
contact with the Ajax guards; because Supermarket employed its
own_ guards who were on duty inside the store, the duties of the
guards supplied by Ajax were limited to patrolling the parking
lot and accompanying Supermarket personnel to the bank; and at
the time of the accident in question, Bass wore an Ajax uniform
and badge and was armed at the direction of Ajax.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, Supermarket
moved the court to strike the evidence against it'on the ground
that no master-servant relationship which would cmake Supermarket
liable for the action of Bass had been shown.
Ajax moved to strike the evidence against it on the ground
that it showed a marked and unusual departure by Bass from the
scope of his employment and therefore Ajax cannot be held liable
for the action of Bass in shooting Smith.
How ought the Court to rule on (a) Supermarket's motion to
strike and on (b) Ajax's motion to strike?
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7.
Frilly Ragsdale returned her new silver fox coat to
Wendell's Fine Fur Fashion Shop for a minor alteration.
She arranged
for the alteration, including the charge, with Sarah Wendell, owner
and manager.
Sarah hung the coat on a dressing room door and instructed Anita Seamstress to make the alteration. When Frilly
returned for her coat a week later, she learned that a sales clerk
had sold the coat to Ann Customer for cash.
Neither the sales
clerk nor Ann Customer realized that the coat was not for sale
or that a $100.00 bill had been left in the coat pocket by Frilly.
Frilly consults you and wants to know if she can recover
from Ann Customer (a) the coat and (b) the money; and (c) whether
or not she-has a good cause of action against Wendell's Fine Fur
Fashion Shop for the sale of her coat.
How ought you to advise her as to each?
8.
On July 7, 1976, Thomas Rogers obtained ai?~B of $20,000
from Security Savings and Loan Association of Radford)hfa }'his loan
was evidenced by a note duly executed by Rogers, pa~:aple"fo the
order of Security Savings & Loan Association one ye,ci,rr~·af:t~}." date
with interest from date at the rate of 9% per annum'
J'he note
was secured by a properly recorded deed of trust upOl) Rogers' home,
a 1 so dated July 7, 19 7 6.
1;W$;~I\i!~S'?; x/
\::(!},.·.:;:.,:.:::.:··--·'·, ·:

This note was paid on its due date, at which time Security
Savings & Loan Association marked it "Paid and Cancelled" and
delivered the note to Rogers.
However, the deed of trust was not
released of record.
One year after the note of July 7, 1976, had
been paid, Rogers found himself in financial difficulties and applied
to Security Savings & Loan Association for another loan of $20,000
which was granted, and the parties agreed that this note should
be secured by the deed of trust which remained unreleased of record,
and this agreement was set forth in the following words which were
written on the face of the note:
"Payment of this note is secured by a deed of trust
on real estate in Radford, Virginia, date9 July 7,
1976, and of record in the Clerk's Office of the
City of Radford.
ls/Thomas Rogers
Security Savings & Loan Association
By: ·
ls/Robert Brown
President"
Prior to the second loan, Glen Bailes had obtained and properly
docketed a judgment against Rogers for $25,000.
Rogers' financial condition continued to deteriorate.
Finally
·on August 3, 1979, Bailes instituted a lien creditor's suit against
Rogers, naming Security Savings & Loan Association and the trustee
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named in the deed of trust of July 7, 1976, as defendants, seeking
a sale of Rogers' real estate to satisfy the liens thereon.
The Court appoints you as a Special Master in Chancery to
report, among other matters, the liens upon the real estate of
Thomas Rogers in the order of their priority.
What should you report to the Court?
9. James and Martha Beam are husband and wife and residents
of the City of Danville.
James' work as a sales executive required
that he be away from home a great deal of the time. Although
provided for handsomely, Martha began to complain about being left
alone. As a result of Martha's repeated complaints, the relationship
between them became so strained that Martha moved into a separate
bedroom, stating at the time she was doing so because it was quite
apparent that James preferred his job to her. A day or two later,
James stated he was going to visit his brother in North Carolina
to think things over. During his absence, Martha employed an
attorney and on December 14, 1979, filed her bill of complaint
in the Circuit Court of toe City of Danville, seeking a divorce
from James on the ground of desertion.
Process was served on James
upon his return from North Carolina on December 17, 1979. The
next day James returned to the family home, packed all of his
belongings and moved into an apartment.
He then filed a timely
answer to Martha's complaint, denying the charge of desertion.
Upon a hearing ore tenus, Martha introduced five witnesses,
all of whom testified that on or about the 18th of December, 1979,
James Beam had removed all of his belongings from the home where
he and Martha had formerly resided and had since that time lived
alone in the apartment which he had leased upon his return from
North Carolina.
The only testimony offered by James, in addition to his own,
was that of the apartment building manager who testified that in
the' late afternoon of December 18, 1979, James had come to his
office and shown him the copy of the bill of complaint with subpoena
attached, which had been served upon him, and stated that because
of the divorce suit which had been instituted against him he would
need living quarters, and negotiated a lease of the apartment.
What should be the Court's ruling on Martha's prayer for
divorce?
10. On June 1, 1976, William Dare executed a deed of trust
upon certain real estate situate in Wythe County securing the payment
of three notes for $5,000 each, payable to the order of Third
National Bank of Wytheville, in one, two and three years after
date, with interest from date, payable annually, at-the rate of
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9% per annum.
On April 23, 1977, Dare conveyed the property to Mary Blake,
who expressly assumed the payment of the notes secured by the deed
of trust as a part .of the consideration for the conveyance.
The notes which became due on June 1, 1977, and June 1, 1978,
were duly paid by Mary upon their due dates, but when the note
payable June 1, 1979, was not paid, the Bank wrote Mary Blake on July
1, 1979, that this note, together with 13 months' interest, was due
and she should give the matter her immediate attention.
Mary went to the bank where she advised the Ex~cutive Vice
President that she was temporarily short of funds but expected
to receive a legacy from a deceased uncle within the next three
months and requested that she be permitted to pay the interest
to date and be given an extension of three months to pay the principal of the note which had become due on June 1, 1979. When this
request was granted, Mary paid the interest which had accrued to that
date. This agreement was made without the knowledge of William Dare.
When the note was not paid at the expiration of the three-month
period_ provided in the extension agreement, Third National Bank ·
of Wytheville brought an action in the Circuit Court of Wythe County
against both William Dare and Mary Blake seeking judgment on that.
note.
Upon the trial of the case, when the foregoing facts had
been established by the evidence, Dare moved the Court for summary
judgment.
What should be the ruling of the Court?

